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STANDING TO CHALLENGE TAX TREATMENT OF
COMPETITORS
For various policy reasons, federal administrative agencies pro-
mulgate rules designed to encourage certain activities or to benefit
a specific class of persons to the exclusion or disadvantage of others.
For example, rulings of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)' that
accord favorable tax treatment to some parties may impair the rela-
tive economic position of their competitors. Predictably, persons
disadvantaged by the more favorable treatment accorded others
have attempted to challenge these rulings.
A principal obstacle confronting competitors seeking to challenge
such rulings is the well-established requirement that a litigant in
the federal courts must have standing to seek judicial remedy.2
Traditional analysis of the standing requirement, based on the
case or controversy clause of article IlI of the Constitution,3 focuses
on the personal interest of the litigant:4 to ensure the necessary
1. 26 U.S.C. § 7805 (1970) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate to
prescribe rules and regulations for the enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code. See
generally Asimow, Standing to Challenge Lenient Tax Rules: A Statutory Solution, 6 TAx
NOms 227 (March 6, 1978).
2. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organ., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin. 422
U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614
(1973); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1972); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Arnold Tours, Inc.
v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970) (per curiam); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association
of Data Processing Serv. Organs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per
curiam); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
See generally Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surro-
gate for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional
Analysis, 86 HAxv. L. Rxv. 645 (1973).
3. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 provides that:
The Judicial Power shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, on which
shall be made. . . [and] to controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party; - to controversies between two or more states; - between a State and
Citizens or another state; -between Citizens of different States . . . and be-
tween a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
4. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organ., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976). "[Tjhe standing
question in its Art. III aspect 'is whether the plaintiff has "alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy" as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and
to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf."' Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975)). The inquiry focuses on the status of the party initiating the
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adverseness,5 the party must have suffered an injury in fact.6 The
jurisdiction of the federal courts has been circumscribed further
by what the Supreme Court has called prudential limitations,
7
designed to inhibit judicial usurption of powers reserved to other
branches of the government." The requirement that the complain-
ant arguably be within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question is
one such limitation adopted by the Court.9
In two recent cases involving competitor standing, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia restricted severely the ability
of an individual investor or a business to challenge the validity of
IRS rulings that purportedly give competitors an unfair economic
advantage. In American Society of Travel Agents, Inc. v.
Blumenthal, 10 decided in 1977, a private travel agency, the Ameri-
can Society of Travel Agents (ASTA), sued the Secretary of the
Treasury, alleging competitive injury caused by the failure of the
IRS to tax the travel service income of a tax exempt competitor, the
American Jewish Congress (AJC). According to the plaintiff's
claim, the extensive range of the AJC's travel program" mandated
action, not on the issues he seeks to have adjudicated. Id.; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99
(1968).
5. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The personal stake in the outcome works "to assure
that concrete adverseness . . . upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult. . . questions." Id. at 204.
6. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975). For example, in an effort to restrict its
own jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has held that although a plaintiff has suffered sufficient
injury to meet the case or controversy requirement, he must assert his own legal rights and
not rest his claim on the rights of other parties. Id. at 499; see United States v. Raines, 362
U.S. 17 (1966); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). The Court also has denied standing
to persons having only a generalized grievance shared by a large class of citizens. Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. at 99; see Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. at
208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
7. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). "Without such limitations- . . . essentially
matters of judicial self-governance-the courts would be called upon to decide abstract ques-
tions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more
competent to address the questions . . . ."Id. at 500.
8. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). The separation of powers problem does not arise
from the issue of standing generally, but only when implicated by a substantive issue raised
by the initiating party. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1968).
9. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
10. 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
11. Since its creation in 1961, the AJC travel program experienced dramatic growth. In
1964,'nine tours were offered. By 1975 that figure reached 392. In addition, its gross income
averaged four to five million dollars annually (calculated from the AJC's net income of nearly
one-half million dollars). Brief for Appellants at 7, No. 1782. Its eighty-page travel brochure
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that the resulting income be declared unrelated business income
under sections 51112 and 51313 of the Internal Revenue Code and
therefore excluded from the tax exemption afforded by section
501(c).14 The IRS's failure to tax this income, the ASTA argued,
distorted illegally the ASTA's sphere of business operations and
allowed the AJC an unfair competitive advantage. 15 A divided ap-
pellate court denied standing, 6 unconvinced that the ASTA had
suffered an appreciable injury. 7
In a case decided the same year, 18 Tax Analysts and Advocates
(TAA), a non-profit, public interest corporation and its executive
director, Thomas Field, sought to discontinue certain tax credits
granted oil companies based outside of the United States for their
payment of income taxes to foreign governments. 9 The plaintiffs in
Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal alleged that these pay-
ments were not foreign income taxes that could be offset against
taxable income on a dollar-for-dollar basis but instead were royal-
explains that the tours offer "the superb service and planning which has become the hallmark
of American Jewish Congress tourism." Id.
12. Section 511(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides for the imposition of a "normal
tax" upon "unrelated taxable business income" of any organization whose income normally
is exempt from taxation under § 501(a). I.R.C. § 511(a).
13. I.R.C. § 513(a), which defines unrelated business as:
any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related (aside
from the need of such organization for income or funds or the use it makes of
the profits derived) to the exercise or performance by such organization of its
charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for
its exemption under section 501 ....
14. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) exempts from taxation such organizations as the AJC that are oper-
ated on a non-profit basis exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable purposes.
15. American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d at 148-49.
16. Id. at 148.
17. Chief Judge Bazelon dissented in both American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blu-
menthal, supra, and Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
18. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'g 390 F.
Supp. 927 (D.D.C. 1976).
19. I.R.C. § 901(b)(1) (1976) allows domestic corporations a tax credit in "the amount of
any income. . . taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign country .... "
Issued in 1955 and 1968, the IRS rulings authorizing the credits declared that certain "income
taxes" paid to Middle East, South African, and South American countries were creditable
to the tax liability of the paying corporations. Rev. Rul. 55-296, 1955-1 C.B. 386; Rev. Rul.
68-552, 1968-2 C.B. 306. Several unpublished IRS rulings also were contested. Recently,
however, the IRS has reversed its policy, holding that payments to certain countries, notably
Libya and Saudi Arabia, are not to be treated as income taxes. Rev. Rul. 78-63. Because the
previous rulings pertaining to the major oil exporting countries still were effective, the plain-
tiff's complaint was not moot.
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ties, deductible only from gross income. Both TAA and Field
claimed standing as federal taxpayers while Field, who owned a
small oil well in Pennsylvania, also alleged standing as a competi-
tor.
Again the court of appeals denied standing. Determining that the
plaintiffs had suffered no judicially cognizable injury, the court
summarily rejected their claim of standing as taxpayers."0 The court
agreed, however, that Field, as a competitor of foreign-based oil
companies, had been injured by IRS regulations:' because he could
deduct royalties paid for his oil well only from gross income, Field
was unable to realize the additional savings available to competitors
who offset similar payments as tax credits. Nevertheless, the court
found that Field's interest did not fall within the zone protected by
the relevant provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.2
This Note will analyze the tests for injury in fact and zone of
interests necessary for competitor standing, and will demonstrate
that the approach adopted by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia was too narrow in light of prior Supreme Court deci-
sions.
20. In the leading case on taxpayer standing, Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923),
the plaintiff argued that the federal appropriations necessitated by the Maternity Act of 1921
would increase the plaintiff's tax burden and thus would constitute a taking of property
without due process of law. The Supreme Court held that the claimant must demonstrate
not only that the statute is invalid, but also that he either has suffered or would be in
imminent danger of suffering a specific injury. Moreover, the injury experienced must differ
from that suffered by the population at large. Because, with few exceptions, all citizens pay
income taxes, the Court decided that the plaintiff's claims were overly broad and, thus, the
plaintiff taxpayer was denied standing to litigate the constitutionality of the federal spending
scheme. Id.
In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the Court created a narrow exception to the rule
enunciated in Frothingham. The plaintiffs in Flast also relied upon their taxpayer status to
assert injury. Nevertheless, they were granted standing on the basis of alleged first amend-
ment violations. Assessing the issue of standing in relation to a taxpayer's status and empha-
sizing the need to examine the substantive issues, the Court espoused the requirement that
a "logical nexus" exist between the plaintiff's claim and his alleged status to seek relief. Id.
at 102. As regards a federal taxpayer challenging tax schemes, this examination has two
facets: initially, the complaining party must establish a logical link between his taxpayer
status and the challenged legislative action; he then must demonstrate that a nexus exists
between his taxpayer status and the specific constitutional infringement alleged by citing
explicit constitutional limitations upon the congressional taxing and spending power. Id. at
102-03.
21. 566 F.2d at 138.
22. Id. at 144-45.
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COMPETITOR STANDING AND INJURY IN FACT
Background
The requirement that the plaintiff must have suffered injury in
fact to qualify for standing rests on the constitutional limitation of
federal jurisdiction to cases or controversies. 3 By ensuring that the
plaintiff has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, this
prerequisite guarantees the "concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues." 24 This requirement is important particu-
larly in cases arising under the Constitution because it prevents
federal courts from deciding constitutional issues in hypothetical or
abstract factual situations. 5
Despite these important limitations, a lesser burden of proving
injury in fact has been demanded to challenge actions by federal
administrative agencies. In a series of cases culminating in its 1973
decision, United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures,"8 the Supreme Court expanded significantly the class of
injuries sufficient to convey standing for challenges to agency ac-
tion.
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp,27 decided in 1970, represents the watershed for the cases
addressing statutory challenges to administrative actions. Retailers
of data processing services sued the Comptroller of the Currency
and a national bank, claiming injury from an administrative ruling8
permitting national banks to provide data processing services to
other banks and their customers.29 Bringing their action under sec-
tion 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act,39 the plaintiffs as-
serted standing as "person[s] . . . aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute. ... 3 The substantive
claim rested on the Bank Service Corporation Act,32 which precludes
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. For the relevant text, see note 3 supra.
24. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
25. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968).
26. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
27. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
28. Comptroller's Manual for National Banks 3500 (1966).
29. 397 U.S. at 151.
30. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1966) (amended 1976).
31. Id.
32. 397 U.S. at 155-56. The Act in question directed that "[no bank service corporation
may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for banks." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1864 (1962).
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banks covered by the Act from engaging in any business other than
bank services. Because of the allegedly unlawful invasion by banks
into the market of data processing services, the plaintiffs claimed
economic injury from the loss of potential customers. In addition,
the complaining parties demonstrated that, as a result of the ruling,
several customers had transferred their business to competitor
banks.33
The Court applied a two part test for standing, requiring the
plaintiff to show not only that he had suffered injury in fact but that
his interest arguably was within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.'
The burden of proving injury in fact in competitor suits was distin-
guished from that required in taxpayer suits, in which the plaintiff,
to attain standing, must demonstrate a sufficient logical nexus be-
tween his status as a taxpayer and the challenged legislative ac-
tions. 5 The Court noted: "[W]hile the two [types of suits] have
the same Article I starting point, they do not necessarily track one
another.""8 In light of the potential loss of profits as well as the
actual loss of several customers, the Court concluded that the plain-
tiffs had alleged sufficient injury in fact.37 Moreover, the legislative
history of section 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act, together
with the trend toward the "enlargement of the class of people who
may protest administrative action,"" indicated that the plaintiff's
interests arguably were protected by the statute.
The test enunciated in Data Processing subsequently was applied
in Arnold Tours, Inc., v. Camp.3 19 The plaintiffs, independent travel
agents, challenged a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency au-
thorizing national banks to provide both travel and banking services
to their customers. Contending that this ruling, like that in Data
Processing, offended section 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act,
the travel agents alleged that they had lost and would continue to
lose substantial business as a result of the ruling." Although plain-
tiffs' original complaint alleged an actual loss of customers and
33. 397 U.S. at 152.
34. Id. at 152-53.
35. Id. at 152 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 154.
39. 400 U.S. 45 (1970).
40. Id. at 45.
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profits as a result of the Comptroller's ruling,4' the Supreme Court
upheld the plaintiffs' standing without further discussion of the
injury suffered.
One year later, the Court again applied the Data Processing test
for injury in fact. In Investment Co. Institute v. Camp,4 2 an associ-
ation of open-end investment companies charged that a regula-
tion 3 allowing national banks to operate an investment fund in
competition with the mutual fund industry violated the Glass-
Steagall Banking Act of 1933.11 Observing that the injury alleged
by the plaintiffs was indistinguishable from that asserted in Data
Processing, the Court upheld the plaintiff's standing to challenge
the regulation. However, it failed to discuss the nature of the alleged
injury, concluding only that it was sufficient to satisfy the Data
Processing test."
In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP)," a 1973 decision, the Supreme Court articu-
lated its broadest interpretation of the injury in fact requirement.
After the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) approved certain
freight rate surcharges pending permanent rate increases, the plain-
tiff student organization filed suit contending that the ruling would
damage the environment and cause its members economic, recrea-
tional, and aesthetic harm. Maintaining that its members used local
recreational areas that would be polluted as a result of the sur-
charge's adverse effect on recycling efforts, SCRAP further alleged
noncompliance by the ICC with the National Environmental Policy
Act 47 in failing to issue an environmental impact statement." The
41. Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 286 F. Supp. 770, 771 (D. Mass. 1968).
42. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
43. 12 C.F.R. Pt. 9 (1970).
44. 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
45. 401 U.S. at 620-21.
46. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1973).
48. 412 U.S. at 688. Specifically, SCRAP alleged that each of its members would be re-
quired to pay more for finished products; that each of its members "[u]ses the forests rivers,
streams, mountains, and other natural resources surrounding the Washington Metropolitan
area and at his legal residence, for camping, hiking, fishing, sightseeing, and other recrea-
tional [and] aesthetic purposes," and that these activities had been affected adversely by
the increased freight rates; that each of its members breathes the air within the Washington
metropolitan area and the area of his legal residence and that this air had suffered increased
pollution caused by the modified rate structure; and, finally, that each member had been
forced to pay increased taxes as a result of the sums necessarily expended to dispose of
otherwise reusable waste materials. Id. at 678.
[Vol. 19:808
COMPETITOR STANDING
Court acknowledged that the harm suffered by SCRAP existed only
through an "attenuated line of causation,""9 but nevertheless it held
that the pleadings satisfied the requirement that the plaintiff allege
"that he has been or will in fact be perceptibly harmed by the
challenged agency action."50
The breadth of the Court's decision is evidenced by its recognition
that aesthetic as well as economic injury can confer standing. More-
over, because the rate increases had not yet been effectuated, the
claimed injury was prospective only and therefore speculative.51 Al-
though the Court noted that the allegations must be true and capa-
ble of proof at trial,52 it emphasized that the issue of standing must
be determined not by the prospects of proof at trial but only on the
basis of the pleadings.53 To date the decision in SCRAP represents
the most attenuated injury recognized by the Court in support of a
plaintiff's standing to challenge an agency action. Notably, though,
this broad view was not articulated in the context of a competitor
suit.
In cases following SCRAP the Court appears to have limited the
opportunities for successfully asserting standing. For example, in
the 1975 case of Warth v. Seldin54 the plaintiff was denied standing
to challenge an allegedly exclusionary zoning plan. Although the
Court acknowledged that the claimed injury may be indirect and
still satisfy the test, it nevertheless cautioned that a remote nexus
between the challenged action and the alleged injury would render
more difficult proof that "in fact, the asserted injury was the conse-
quence of the defendant's actions, or that prospective relief will
remove the harm. 5 5 Holding that the plaintiffs had failed to dem-
onstrate in their pleadings that the defendant's actions actually
caused the alleged injury, the Court denied standing.
The Court's predilection for these more stringent pleading re-
quirements was crystallized further in a 1976 decision, Simon v.
49. Id. at 688.
50. Id.
51. "[S]tanding is not to be denied merely because the ultimate harm alleged is a threat-
ened future one rather than an accomplished fact." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Organ., 426 U.S. 26, 61 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. 412 U.S. at 689.
53. Id.
54. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
55. Id. at 505.
1978]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:808
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization.6 After the IRS re-
duced the quantity of indigent services that must be provided by
hospitals seeking tax-exempt status,57 several low-income persons
and their representative organizations challenged the ruling as an
illegal inducement to non-profit hospitals to offer fewer free services
to indigent persons." The plaintiffs alleged that as a consequence
of the ruling they were denied services that otherwise would be
available to them.
The Court relied partially on its decision in Warth to conclude
that the claimed injury was purely speculative; none of the evidence
offered by the plaintiffs established that but for the challenged rul-
ing they would receive the services of which they allegedly were
being deprived. Expressing doubt as to whether the alleged injury
was even remediable by judicial intervention, the Court noted that
there was no indication that the hospitals would not choose to forego
favorable tax treatment to avoid providing additional services for
indigents. 0
In effect, the Supreme Court's most recent decisions require the
plaintiff to meet strict pleading requirements before he can chal-
lenge agency action. In addition to showing a narrow causal nexus
between the alleged injury and the challenged action,6" the com-
56. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
57. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. The 1969 ruling described two hospitals having
different operating policies regarding nonpaying indigent services. One offered only emer-
gency services to nonpaying indigents, referring those requesting ordinary services to other
hospitals. Thus, the hospital did not "[operate] to the extent of its financial ability for those
not able to pay" as required by the 1956 Ruling. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202, 203. Under
the 1969 ruling, however, it was allowed a charitable exemption. To remedy the inconsistency
between the rulings, the 1969 ruling preempted the 1956 ruling to eliminate "the requirement
relating to caring for patients without charge or at rates below cost." Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-
2 C.B. 117-19.
58. 426 U.S. at 32-33.
59. Id. at 42-43.
60. Id. The Court in Eastern Kentucky recognized the inference created by the allegations
of the plaintiff "that these hospitals, or some of them, are so financially dependent upon...
favorable tax treatment . . . that they would admit [indigents] if a court required such
admission as a condition to receipt of that treatment." Id. This inference, however, was held
to be speculative at best and by itself did not support the plaintiff's contention of the
hospital's dependency upon favorable tax treatment.
61. This requirement is relevant particularly when assessing a litigant's standing to chal-
lenge indirect injury by agency action. The "perceptible" though "attenuated" injury present
in SCRAP will no longer be sufficient to allow a plaintiff standing. After Worth and Eastern
Kentucky, to meet the threshold requirement of Article III, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
816
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plaining party must demonstrate that the harm has arisen or will
in fact rise if the action is permitted to continue. Furthermore, he
must convince the court that his injury is not merely speculative
and that upon a favorable decision on the merits it can redress the
injury.02
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion to Warth u. Seldin,
suggested that these stringent requirements signalled a return to
outmoded notions of fact pleading, obliging parties who seek to
challenge administrative actions to allege their case within unduly
narrow limits. In addition to these procedural consequences, Justice
Brennan questioned whether these requirements would encourage
the judiciary to speculate prematurely on the merits of the claim.64
Consequently, the threshold decision of standing would depend on
the court's view as to the likelihood of the plaintiff proving the
allegations, especially the claimed injury, at a trial on the merits.
American Society of Travel Agents, Inc. and Tax Analysts
In Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumentha6 5 the owner of a small
domestic oil well contended that he had suffered economic harm66
the defendant's action in fact caused the alleged harm. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Organ., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975).
62. [W]hen a plaintiff's standing is brought into issue the relevant inquiry
is whether. . . the plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision. Absent such a showing exercise of its power
by a federal court would be gratuitous and thus inconsistent with the Article
m limitation.
426 U.S. at 38 (emphasis supplied). The basic Article I "injury in fact" limitation upon
standing has been narrowed significantly and quietly from the indirect "perceptible" injury
accepted by the Court in SCRAP to the "injury. . . that is likely to be redressed" found
wanting by the Court in Eastern Kentucky. Compare United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973) with Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Organ., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
63. 426 U.S. at 62.
64. Id. at 65-66 (quoting Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 176 (1970)) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
65. 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
66. The plaintiff owner alleged two distinct injuries. First, he asserted that the IRS rulings
illegally exempted foreign-based oil corporations from paying domestic income taxes, thereby
reducing their overhead costs. This lower overhead allegedly allowed these corporations to sell
their oil at a reduced price. Because prices charged by international companies determine
the market price for crude oil, Field was required to sell his oil at this lower price, thus
depriving him of potential income from the sale of his domestically produced oil. Second,
Field contended that the exemption of these foreign-based corporations from domestic taxa-
tion increased their net income, making them a more atractive investment than domestic oil
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as a result of an IRS ruling that allowed competitors to receive tax
credits for income taxes paid to foreign governments. Claiming that
such amounts were actually royalties and therefore deductible only
from gross income as business expenses rather than as tax credits,
which reduce dollar-for-dollar the amount paid in federal income
tax, the plaintiff charged that he was placed unlawfully in a disad-
vantaged business position relative to his competitors. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed that the alleged injury
was sufficient to meet the injury in fact test enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Data Processing.17 Nevertheless, it denied stand-
ing because the plaintiff failed to allege a claim arguably within the
zone of interests protected by the relevant statute.
A month later in American Society of Travel Agents, Inc. v.
Blumenthal"' a different panel of the court re-examined the same
issue-whether the plaintiff had standing to challenge an IRS policy
that purportedly conferred upon the plaintiff's competitors an un-
lawful economic advantage. The plaintiffs, the American Society of
Travel Agents (ASTA) and several individual travel agencies,
sought to challenge the failure of the IRS to tax certain income
earned by the American Jewish Congress (AJC), an organization
exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code." ASTA asserted that the income from AJC's operation
of travel services, conducted in competition with the plaintiffs' busi-
ness, should be treated as unrelated business income under section
513(a) of the Code and therefore taxable.7 0 Alleging that ASTA
companies. This result, asserted Field, was injurious to the capital structure of domestic oil
companies. 566 F.2d at 136.
67. 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
68. 566 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
69. I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(3) provide in pertinent part:
(a) Exemption from taxation.-An organization described in subsection (c)
• ..shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle ....
(c) List of exempt organizations.-The following organizations are referred
to in subsection (a):
(3) Corporations and any community chest, fund, or foundation, or-
ganized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, test-
ing for public safety, literary or educational purposes . .. .
70. See note 10 supra. This argument by the ASTA was supported by a 1968 decision of
the District Director for the Internal Revenue Service of New York that purported to apply
the § 511 unrelated business tax to AJC's travel tour income. His proposal was based on the
following grounds: (1) the travel program was carried on in a "commercial manner," (2) its
[Vol. 19:808
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members suffered a loss of customers and profits as a result of this
IRS action, the plaintiffs claimed that the ruling allowed the AJC
to sell packaged tours at prices lower than those plaintiffs could
charge and still earn a profit, and, consequently, the ASTA mem-
bers lost expected customers and profits. The appellate court de-
nied standing, however, holding that the plaintiffs failed to demon-
strate any actual injury resulting from the defendant's administra-
tive action. In support of its conclusion, the court noted that the
plaintiffs had failed to identify either prospective customers who
spurned the services of ASTA members for the lower-priced AJC
tours or patrons of AJC who might have patronized ASTA mem-
bers but for the AJC's allegedly unlawful economic advantage."
Relying on the causation and redressability tests formulated by
the Supreme Court in Eastern Kentucky, the court found the
claimed injury to be purely speculative,72 and questioned the capac-
ity of that injury for judicial redress.73
The court distinguished Data Processing, upon which earlier in
Tax Analysts a different panel of the same court had relied to find
injury in fact, stating that it did not "clearly define the contours of
competitor standing . . . . 7 The court emphasized that Data
Processing was not a tax case,75 that "[w]hatever may be the im-
pact of competitor standing when ordinary administrative action is
at issue, we do not believe that Data Processing should be read to
endorse standing for any private business, individual or corporate,
which wishes to contest the tax treatment of a competitor. '7 The
court of appeals thus assumed that the Supreme Court, by empha-
sizing the causation and redressability factors, had attempted to
limit the broad concept of injury in fact endorsed in SCRAP.77 This
assumption, however, failed to recognize that requirements of caus-
ation and redressability were formulated in cases easily distinguish-
operation was "regular . . . not intermittant," (3) "the features accenting Jewish interests
is [sic] a 'cultural veneer,"' and (4) use of the travel programs was unnecessary "for proper
functioning of the [AJC] membership." Brief for Appellants at 8. This proposal was subse-
quently overruled by the National Office of the IRS. Id.
71. 566 F.2d at 148-49.
72. Id. at 149-50.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 151.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 151-52.
77. Id.
1978]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
able from competitor suits. Moreover, while failing to explain why
IRS cases should be differentiated from other administrative cases,
the court of appeals abandoned the principles enunciated in an
analogous competitor suit, Data Processing, for those of Eastern
Kentucky in which a challenge to IRS policy by low-income persons
was rejected. Attempting to further distinguish Data Processing, the
appellate court noted that the plaintiff in that case had objected to
any competition by national banks, whereas in Travel Agents the
plaintiff sought only to have its competition taxed rather than elim-
inated." As Chief Judge Bazelon remarked in his dissent,79 this
objection regarding Data Processing, though, goes merely to the
"extent of the injury suffered, not to its speculative or hypothetical
nature."80
In Travel Agents the court's preliminary assessment of the plain-
tiffs' ability to substantiate their claim clearly colored its decision
as to standing. Emphasis was placed on the plaintiffs' failure to
allege specific instances of customer attrition, and the complaint
was criticized as being framed abstractly in terms of the injury
arising from the defendant's creation of an "unfair competitive at-
mosphere."'8t As predicted by Justice Brennan's dissent in Warth,
the Supreme Court's causation and redressability tests clearly en-
couraged the court in Travel Agents to apply outdated strict plead-
ing requirements, as well as to speculate prematurely on the merits
of the plaintiffs' case.
Having failed to distinguish Data Processing, the court in Tax
Analysts proceeded to apply to a competitor suit criteria developed
in non-competitor suits with an insufficient analysis of the unique
characteristics of the former. Because of the far-reaching effects of
agency action, plaintiffs in non-competitor suits appropriately may
be required to focus clearly on the circumstances of the alleged
injury in order to avoid adjudication of abstract or hypothetical
issues. A competitor's claim, however, is by its nature more nar-
rowly focused. Traditionally recognized as sufficient, the alleged
injury frequently will be economic, the causal nexus focusing on the
nature of the commercial market. 2 Although narrow pleading re-
78. Id. at 150-51.
79. Id. at 160 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 148-49.
82. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had not required an "absolute
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quirements may be necessary to establish standing in general chal-
lenges to agency action, the nature of a competitor's suit should
permit less stringent requirements without violation of the princi-
ples underlying standing. The injury alleged by the ASTA, virtually
identical to that alleged in Tax Analysts, should have satisfied the
Article IH injury in fact requirement.
ZONE OF INTEREST
Background
In considering standing to challenge an agency ruling, the Su-
preme Court in Data Processing3 required the plaintiff not only to
show that he had suffered injury in fact from the agency action, but
also that the '"interest sought to be protected. . . . [was] arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question."'" By adopting this
test, the Court attempted to clarify its long-standing requirement
that the plaintiff show the right invaded to be a "legal right, one of
property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious
invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege.",,,
This refinement was deemed necessary because the "legal interest"
test was so intertwined with the merits of the case as to cloud the
distinction between the requirements for standing and those for
success on the merits.86 In addition, the Court indicated that the
zone of interests test was based not on Article III jurisdictional
considerations, which lie at the root of the injury in fact require-
ment, but rather on a "rule of self-restraint."87
The scope and applicability of the zone of interests requirement
has been questioned increasingly since Data Processing. In a concur-
ring and dissenting opinion" filed both in Data Processing and its
companion case, Barlow v. Collins,"S Mr. Justice Brennan disagreed
at the outset with the Court's addition of the zone of interest test
certainty" that prospective relief would redress the harm. See Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v.
Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
83. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
84. Id. at 153.
85. Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939).
86. 397 U.S. at 153.
87. Id. at 154.
88. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
89. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
19781
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
to that of injury in fact. Nevertheless, he discussed possible sources
for determining whether the plaintiffs claim fell within the zone of
interests protected by the statute: "Congressional intent that a par-
ticular plaintiff have review, may be found either in express statu-
tory language granting it to the plaintiff's class, or, in the absence
of such express language, in statutory indicia from which a right to
review may be inferred."10 Relying on this language to interpret the
zone of interest requirement, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in a 1970 decision, Constructores Civiles de Centroam-
erica, S.A. v. Hannah,91 similarly concluded that "to divine Con-
gressional intent we must examine the statutory indicia ... ."92
The same year, the Supreme Court employed this rationale in
Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp 3 to uphold a travel agency's standing
to challenge a ruling that permitted banks to provide competitive
travel services. Thus, having reaffirmed the Data Processing tests,
the Court sought to ascertain the zone of interests protected by the
relevant statute by looking to the provision's legislative history.
Since Arnold Tours, the Court has provided little guidance as to
the proper scope or application of the zone of interests test, focusing
instead on the requirement that the plaintiff allege injury in fact.
For example, in Sierra Club v. Morton,4 United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,95 and Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,9" the Court expressly dec-
lined to reach questions concerning the zone of interests test. The
test was accorded only scant attention in footnotes to several other
cases," and has nowhere been developed further by the Court.8
90. Id. at 174 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis supplied).
91. 459 F.2d 1183 (1970).
92. Id. at 1188.
93. 400 U.S. 45 (1970). See also Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971), in which
the Court addressed a challenge to a ruling allowing banks to compete with the plaintiffs in
operating a mutual investment fund, allegedly in violation of the Glass-Steagall Banking Act
of 1933, 48 Stat. 162. The Court summarily upheld the plaintiff's standing without discussion
of the scope of interests arguably protected by that Act.
94. 405 U.S. 727, 733 n.5 (1972).
95. 412 U.S. 669, 686 n.13 (1973).
96. 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176 n.9 (1974); Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 n.16 (1974).
98. When applying the test enunciated in Data Processing, few courts of appeals have
denied standing under the zone of interests test once the plaintiffs were found to have suffered
injury in fact. See Gifford-Hill & Co. v. FTC, 523 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Clinton Com-
munity Hosp. Corp. v. Southern Md. Medical Center, 510 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
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Tax Analysts
In Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal99 the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia used the zone of interests test to
deny standing to the plaintiff. Although acknowledging the exist-
ence of competitive injury in fact as a result of tax credits unlawfully
granted the plaintiff's competitors, the court nevertheless held that
the interest asserted was not even arguably within the zone of inter-
ests protected by the relevant Code section.10 In accordance with
the Supreme Court's rationale in Data Processing,'0' the appellate
court stated that the purpose of the zone of interests test is to limit
the role of the judiciary, thus "allowing the courts to define those
instances when it believes the exercise of its power at the instigation
of a particular party is not congruent with the mandate of the legis-
lative branch in a particular subject area.' ' 02 The issue focuses on
the interface between Congressional intent in promulgating the rele-
vant code section and the interests claimed to have been infringed.
Acknowledging that use of the words "arguably" and "zone" in
the Data Processing test necessarily established a broad standard,
the court in Tax Analysts nevertheless asserted that the test was
intended to limit accessibility to the federal courts for the purposes
of challenging agency action."'3 The scope of this limitation, stated
the court, depended on the congressional purpose underlying the
statute at issue, thus forcing the reviewing court to discern that
intent consistent with the basic principles underlying the standing
doctrine. Adopting an approach that restricted the analysis to the
statutory provision in question, the court in Tax Analysts refused
to consider the provision's setting in the Code or even its legislative
history unless the latter expressly extended or denied standing to
the plaintiff.' 4 Applying this test, the court denied standing, hold-
422 U.S. 1048 (1975); Higginbotham v. Barrett, 473 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1973); Colligan v.
Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). See
also K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 22.02-11, at 510 (1976).
99. 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
100. Id. at 143-45. The particular Code section implicated by the plaintiff's allegations was
§ 901(b) of the I.R.C., allowing qualified citizens of the United States and domestic corpora-
tions to claim a tax credit for any income, war profits, and excess profits taxes paid or accrued
during the taxable year to certain foreign countries. I.R.C. § 901(b)(1).
101. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
102. Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d at 140.
103. Id. at 140 & n.64.
104. Id. at 140-42.
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ing that the pertinent statutory provision sought to prevent double
taxation of persons paying certain foreign income and other taxes,
not to protect the plaintiffs from unfair competition."5
Two justifications were offered for confining the analysis to the
relevant statutory provision.' Assuming that the case proceeds to
a decision on the merits, the court stated that focusing solely on the
applicable section would ensure that the plaintiff has a "strong
connection to the controversy," thus upholding the policy of com-
plete adverseness which underlies the standing doctrine. This
test, however, begs the question, stating in essence that if the stat-
ute specifies that the plaintiff is the proper party to raise the issue,
he is the proper party; if the statute does not so indicate, then he is
not. As a second justification for limiting its analysis, the court
pointed to the diversity and complexity of the provisions and poli-
cies underlying the Internal Revenue Code. In conclusory form, the
court stated that to extrapolate the legislative intent behind one
Code section by reference to another would "distort the role of the
courts in relation to the legislative branch. ... 01 Given the com-
105. The zone of interests test propounded by the majority in Tax Analysts was "whether
the complaining party has stated an interest which is arguable from the face of the statute."
566 F.2d at 142. Refusing to examine other provisions of the I.R.C., the majority also declined
to examine the legislative history in assessing the zone of protected interests.
Appellant Field had relied upon two sections of the I.R.C. to evidence a congressional intent
to protect businesses from unfair competition due to illegal tax advantages given their com-
petitors. The first is the unrelated business tax as applied to tax exempt organizations. I.R.C.
§§ 501, 511-513. The only relevant passage in the reports of the House and Senate subcommit-
tees concerning the unrelated business tax provides:
The problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is directed here is
primarily that of unfair competition. The tax-free status of these section 101
[now 5011 organizations enables them to use their profits tax free to expand
their operations, which their competitors can expand only with the profits re-
maining after taxes.
H. R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1950); S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
28 (1950). Treasury regulations further support this view by interpreting the primary purpose
of the § 511 unrelated business tax as the elimination of "a source of unfair competition by
placing the unrelated business tax activities of certain exempt organizations upon the same
tax basis as the non-exempt business with which they compete .... " I.R.C. § 1.513-1(b).
The second provision relied upon by Field was the section delineating the extent of ruling
retroactivity. I.R.C. § 7805(b) provides that "[t]he Secretary may prescribe the extent . ..
to which any ruling or regulation . . . shall be applied without retroactive effect." This
section, as interpreted in IBM v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl. 1965),, directs the
Secretary of the Treasury to ensure equality in administration of tax rulings so that disparate
tax treatment does not bestow unfair competitive advantages. 343 F.2d at 919, 923.
106. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d at 140-41.
107. rd. at 141.
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plexity of tax policy, the court apparently feared that allowing
plaintiffs to construe one section of the Code by analogy to other
dissimilar sections would permit limitless extension of the provi-
sions, rendering meaningless the zone of interests test. In addi-
tion, the court may have believed that to analyze the relationship
between various statutory provisions to determine standing would
anticipate the merits of the case, and thus the fine distinctions
between these inquiries would become blurred.
Such considerations, however, do not justify limiting the inquiry
to the sole provision at issue. Ensuring the adverseness of the con-
troversy is a consideration more relevant to the requirement of in-
jury in fact than to the assessment of congressional purpose, and,
moreover, no logical connection exists between the number of provi-
sions involved and the requirement that the plaintiff suffer injury
in fact.',8 Rather than hampering unnecessarily the determination
of congressional intent, an examination of a provision within the
general context of a whole legislative scheme traditionally has been
a valuable means of ascertaining statutory goals. 09 Such a method,
in fact, becomes more valuable when considering statutory systems
as complex as the Internal Revenue Code. As Chief Judge Bazelon
noted in his dissent in American Society of Travel Agents,10 a mis-
108. American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d at 164-65 (Bazelon,
J., dissenting).
109. As Justice Holmes observed, "[i]t is said that when the meaning of language is plain
we are not to resort to evidence to raise doubts. That is rather an axiom of experience than a
rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists." Boston
Sand and Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928). Chief Justice Marshall coun-
seled that "[wihere the mind labors to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes
everything from which aid can be derived .... United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
358, 386 (1805). Similarly, Justice Powell, speaking for the Court in University of California
v, Bakke, 46 U.S.L.W. 4896 (1978), sought "whatever aid [was] available [to determinel
the precise meaning of the statute" before the Court. 46 U.S.L.W. at 4900 (emphasis sup-
plied). Analyzing the existence of a private right of action under Title VI, the Court in Bakke
examined the legislative history "against the background of. . .the problem that Congress
was addressing" to discern congressional intention. Id. See also Ellis v. Department of Hous.
and Urban Dev., 551 F.2d 13, 16 (3d Cir. 1977); City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury,
West Hartford, and East Hartford, Nos. 76-6049, -6050, -6059, slip op. at 1096 (2d Cir. 1976);
Concerned Residents of Buck Hill Falls v. Grant, 537 F.2d 29,33-34 (3d Cir. 1976); Cincinnati
Elecs. Corp. v. Kleppe, 509 F.2d 1080, 1086 (6th Cir. 1975); Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360,
1365 (3d Cir. 1974); Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Construc-
tores Civiles de Centroamerica, S.A. v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183, 1188-89 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 691 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1004 (1971).
110. American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d at 165 (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting).
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placed fear exists that courts will be unable to separate the issues
of standing from the merits of the case. Although a consideration of
the merits of the case necessarily will involve a determination of
whether the statutory provisions at issue prescribe what the plain-
tiffs have alleged, the test for standing only requires that the com-
plainant assert an arguable claim. The general tenor of the zone of
interests test is in no way compromised by construing code provi-
sions conjunctively. Such an inquiry may be conducted easily with-
out prejudging the ultimate merits of the claim.
Contrary to precedent in the same circuit,"' the court in Tax
Analysts further limited its inquiry into the zone of protected inter-
ests by concluding that examination of the legislative history of the
relevant statute, beyond identifying an express grant or denial of
plaintiff standing, was improper in determining standing." 2 Reli-
ance on the legislative history, the court argued, would present three
dangers, the first of these being the potential for prejudgment of the
case's merits."3 The court purported to base its refusal to examine
the legislative history on language by the Supreme Court in Arnold
Tours, which suggested that reliance on the legislative history of
the statute in question would be improper."' In Arnold Tours the
Supreme Court had stated that "[i]n Data Processing we did not
rely on any legislative history showing that Congress desired to
protect data processors alone from competition,"'' 5 and proceeded
to hold that the relevant statute also arguably protected travel
111. Constructores Civiles de Centroamerica, S.A. v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir.
1972). In Constructores Civiles the court examined the "statutory indicia" of the statute,
including its preamble, when presented with a vaguely worded statute. The court in
Constructores Civiles concluded that the zone requirement was met if "the challenging party
. . . [showed] that [he was] an intended beneficiary of the statute not necessarily the
primary one." 459 F.2d at 1189. Quoting the instructive concurring opinion of Justice Bren-
nan in Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. at 167, the court in Constructores Civiles observed that
"[e]vidence that [plaintiff's] class is a statutory beneficiary . . . need not be as strong for
the purpose of obtaining review as for the purpose of establishing [plaintiff's] claim on the
merits. [A] . . . slight beneficiary indicia will suffice to establish his right to have review
and thus to reach the merits." 459 F.2d at 1189.
112. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d at 141.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 142 n.74, in which the court misread the Supreme Court's language and con-
cluded that, "[bly not relying on legislative history, as the Supreme Court indicated in
Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp . . . was proper, we avoid the danger of the court settling the
merits in the guise of ruling on standing and thus meet the concern voiced by Justices
Brennan and White."
115. Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45, 46 (1970) (emphasis supplied).
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agencies agaifist unlawful competition. Thus, far from ignoring leg-
islative history, the Supreme Court implicitly reaffirmed its reli-
ance on the same legislative history discussed in Data Processing.
It appears that the court of appeals in Tax Analysts simply misread
the language of the Supreme Court. Moreover, the court's appre-
hension that reliance on legislative history would result in a pre-
mature consideration of the merits of the case, as previously noted,
is based on an erroneous lack of confidence in the federal courts'
ability to apply the "arguably" portion of the zone of interests test.
The court's second justification for limiting its analysis is equally
unpersuasive: an examination of the legislative history, the court
argued, would be "unilluminating. ' ' 6 The traditional reliance on
this material to expand and illuminate statutes clearly repudiates
this contention. Finally, the court urged that use of the legislative
history would undermine the breadth of the zone of interests test,
essentially urging preservation of the generous nature of the test as
a reason to limit its scope. If the concern is to identify precisely
those persons whose interests Congress intended to protect, it is
unclear why the court refused to use a valuable source of this infor-
mation.
For these reasons, therefore, the court of appeals limited its in-
quiry to the face of the statute in dispute. In so doing, however, the
court unnecessarily deprived itself of traditionally informative
sources and encouraged judicial speculation as to congressional in-
tent without benefit of the legislative expression of this intent. Such
speculation can lead only to the result eschewed by the court, un-
warranted judicial interference with the legislative branch.
CONCLUSION
Decisions by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Tax Analysts and Travel Agents indicate unfortunate and
unnecessary confusion in the federal courts as to the proper applica-
tion of the injury in fact and zone of interests tests developed by the
Supreme Court in Data Processing and extended in subsequent de-
cisions. The narrow view endorsed by the appellate court severely
restricts standing to challenge administrative actions, leaving broad
agency discretion open to potential distortion by powerful special
interest groups, such as the oil industry. Increased competitive dis-
116. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d at 142.
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parity inevitably will result, without affording adequate opportuni-
ties to challenge such action in the courts. With regard to IRS policy
in particular, several factors favor a more liberal approach to com-
petitor standing.1 17 Parties suffering injury should have an oppor-
tunity for redress; this opportunity should not be curtailed merely
because the tax liability of a third party is in dispute. Moreover,
parties challenging potentially unlawful reductions of another's tax
liability seek to increase, rather than decrease, tax revenue and
thus act in conformity with the general scheme of just tax adminis-
tration.'8
Until the issue of competitor standing is resolved, either by Con-
gress or the Supreme Court, plaintiffs must prepare to allege and
prove direct causation and redressibility of their claims, demon-
strating that the protected status claimed under the zone of interest
test is apparent from the face of the statute in question. Unfortun-
ately, few claimants will be able to meet such strict requirements,
leaving competitors indirectly suffering serious economic disadvan-
tages from agency rulings in the position of suffering only techni-
cally speculative harm.
117. Tannenbaum, Public Interest Tax Litigation Challenging Substantive I.R.S.
Decisions, 27 NAT'L TAX J. 373 (1974).
118. Id. at 379-80.
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